#### Otherization outweighs.

Ben Fermor 20. Ben Fermor completed his PhD at Leeds and before that undertook a BA in International Politics and MSc in International Relations at the University of Surrey. and Holland, J Security and polarization in Trump’s America: securitization and the domestic politics of threatening others. Global Affairs, 6 (1). pp. 55-70. ISSN 2334-0460 orcid.org/0000-0003-4883-332X (2020)

Conclusion

This article explored US foreign policy discourses under President Trump by situating securitisation theory within the Gramscian concept of a discursive war of position. By embedding securitisation, understood as a repetitive process of articulation opposing a threat to a referent object, within the wider war of position, we have provided a theoretical framework through which to understand structure, change and continuity in US foreign policy during Trump’s presidency. Using this framework in application to our dataset of over 1200 official, opposition and media texts, we have demonstrated three distinct securitising moves by two important groups of actors (or ‘historical blocs’) during this time. The first of these can be seen in the initial period of Trump’s presidency, as the administration framed immigration as a major threat to the nation, and used this framing to legitimate and defend two key policies: the Muslim/Travel Ban and the border ‘wall’ between Mexico and the US. In response to this, opposition figures and critical media voices began articulating a new discursive structure which framed the Trump White House as an existential threat to liberal America and its progressive ‘melting pot’ values. Finally, a third securitising move can be recognised in the sustained attempt by the Trump administration and its supporters in the media to establish the ‘left’ as a threat to Americans, through its imagined obsession with ‘political correctness’ and Trump’s potential wrong-doing, which distract from the crucial battle to protect Americans from (Trump’s identified) ‘real’ threats to America.

By situating these securitising moves within the Gramscian war of position setting, we build on the works of Balzacq (2005), Côté (2016) and Wilhelmsen (2017) to unpack the flow and contestation present in the formation and (re)production of (US) foreign policy, beyond the traditional understanding of securitisation as a singular moment of ‘elevation’ from normal to securitised politics. Furthermore, the Gramscian investigation of distinct coalitions or historical blocs competing for discursive hegemony allows us to unravel the complex and interwoven relationship between ‘domestic politics’ and ‘foreign policy’. In doing this, we have shown how both official and opposition camps have attempted to frame the other as a threat to different imaginations of the national self, and in turn have used this to legitimate their own foreign policy agendas, whilst discrediting those of the other.

#### The link turns case, poisons risk calculus, and cements violent discrimination. Independently, refuse ‘dropped x scenario’ because complexity brackets predictions.

Christopher Morris 25. Writing Department, York University Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies. “Introduction to Special Issue: Technical Communication In/Against Security Logics.” Journal of Technical Writing and Communication. December 10, 2025. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00472816251384902

My own interest in security logics began in the realm of risk. As a graduate research associate at a large U.S. insurance firm, I wrote documentation for actuarial and investment models meant to protect funds in the event of large losses. In producing such work, I observed that both the risk models and their documentation are always incomplete (i.e., insecure), because there is always an aspect of reality and of future events that analysis cannot capture. Additionally, many of the models relied on financial securitization instruments that are themselves risky. This realization coincided with my research into housing—research that examined technical communication's role in the legitimation of risky mortgage-backed securities that led to the Global Financial Crisis. Later, in a different role at a regional bank, I wrote mortgage policies and procedures. At each of these positions, I perceived a taken-for-grantedness regarding two consequential frameworks embedded in the industry: (1) the incompleteness of risk management theories and (2) the economic and social inequality perpetuated by the instrumentalizations of risk and security. Indeed, despite public regulatory efforts, insurance, financial, and housing markets practice racial and sexual discrimination, charging higher rates on inferior products for populations deemed too risky and too insecure (Chibanda, 2022; Gaulding, 1995). As the Global Financial Crisis—its maligned relationships with subprime mortgage loans and bailouts—laid bare, misappropriating risk from institutional decision-makers onto marginalized stakeholders obscures debilitating flaws in the system. As I went about my work documenting financial products, I often questioned technical writers’ abilities and ethical imperative to confront the double-faced logics upon which material advantage and sociopolitical coherence are achieved. Indeed, working as a technical writer in corporate America crystallized a disorienting aletheia—that security for some always results in insecurity for others.

#### Epistemology is prior. Plan focus is knowledge reductionism that rigs the game by presupposing that the K is wrong.

Navid Pourmokhtari 24. Department of Social Sciences at Concordia University of Edmonton. “Toward a Paradigm Shift in International Relations Studies: (Re)Claiming World Peace.” Springer Nature Switzerland. April 12, 2024. https://www.academia.edu/126906085/Toward\_a\_Paradigm\_Shift\_in\_International\_Relations\_Studies\_Re\_Claiming\_World\_Peace

Under the status quo, one that privileges certain catchphrases, languages, theories, statements, and values, there is no escaping the assumptions and mentalities that inform IR knowledges and practices, and precisely because they are ahistorical/particularistic spatially and temporally, colonial/gendered ideologically and discursively, and West/ Eurocentric ontologically and epistemologically. All this has had the cumulative knowledge effect of “narrowing down the terms of the debate” at the expense of “more open-ended approaches” that “do not prejudge the nature of the dominant units in the system, privilege one sector of activity over another or give precedence to one mode of explanation over another.”2 As a consequence of such knowledge reductionism, “not all knowledge has an equal chance of being selected for an IRtheory curriculum,”3 which hampers any hope of “reconceptualiz[ing] … a world centered upon the fixity of the nation-state and power relations.”4 That all this is the case is due, first and foremost, to the assumptions and rationalities that IR paradigm maintainer theories advance by demarcating the discipline such that alternatives are relegated to the margins where questions of war and military conflict are concerned. This is because, R. B. J. Walker asserts, “[as] a paradigm [, IR is] grounded in the ‘timeless truths’ of politics as presumably expressed by authors such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes [who among other Western male political philosophers have shaped, decisively,] the IR discipline.

#### Entanglement. Bifurcating ‘objective policy analysis’ from ‘subjective securitization’ decimates impactful iteration, ensuring policy failure.

Christopher Morris 25. Writing Department, York University Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies. “Introduction to Special Issue: Technical Communication In/Against Security Logics.” Journal of Technical Writing and Communication. December 10, 2025. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00472816251384902

I interviewed Dr. Jana Wrange, whose 2022 article “Entangled Security Logics” inspired this special issue. Her own research on the revival of European civil defense amid Russian military aggression was initiated when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, and European nations felt unprepared to respond to Russian attacks. Wrange, who worked in civil defense, sees an important aspect of security logics being the inevitable ambiguity that arises on two fronts: (1) the strategic ambiguity deployed at the level of institutional discourse and (2) the uncertainty in how practitioners interpret discourse, especially around a thematic experience as subjective as one's security. Thus, security logics refer not just to superstructures but also to how writers, managers, bureaucrats, designers, etc., make sense of ambiguous yet immediate superstructures in their work. In that respect, Wrange points to written documentation as a genre that practitioners continually reference in processes of iterative interpretation. “I think there's also really important individual aspect to it as well that needs to be also taken into consideration if you want to make a case for interpretations or logics in general,” Wrange said in our interview, “because it's their personal logic as well which is representative of the state logic.” With Wrange's perspective in mind, I view this special issue as an opportunity for the field to process its entangled relationship to security and for the individual contributors to showcase their own security logics; and like those practitioners who continually return to documentation to make sense of ambiguous conditions, I hope readers can refer back to this collection for guidance in times of intellectual and critical need. After all, the world is watching and is being watched.

#### The ballot solves by refusing to accept the 1AC, but our links meet because ‘securitization bad’ is a causal DA.

Kevin Spillman 25. US Navy Officer recently stationed in Latin America and will be returning to the US FOURTH FLEET area of operations to serve as a combat systems department head. He holds an M.A. in International Security from King’s College London, and a certification in Western Hemisphere Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a Global Resilience and Security Senior Fellow. “The Deterrence Façade.” Small Wars Journal. December 15, 2025. https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/12/16/the-deterrence-facade/

A speech act, however, is merely rhetoric until a relevant audience accepts the issue as existential. This acceptance is the critical and often overlooked step. The administration’s narrative has been consistently reinforced through official statements, executive orders, and the dramatic publication of strike videos. The publication of these videos, for instance, is not merely a message to the enemy; it is a performance of the speech act for the domestic audience. It is designed to prove that the narco-terrorist threat is real and that the elimination policy is necessary and effective. This creates a powerful feedback loop. The audience has accepted this move, not because it was logical, but because the speech act effectively tapped into genuine public concerns about drug-related deaths and national security. This public and political acceptance, from the nodding junior officers to a compliant Congress, is the key that unlocks the next and most dangerous step: legitimizing extraordinary measures.

Because the audience accepted the existential threat framing, the securitizing actor successfully lifted the issue beyond the realm of normal, deliberative politics. This move establishes a zone of exception, a political space where normal rules, legal norms, and democratic procedures no longer apply. This zone of exception is precisely what has enabled the extraordinary measures that define this operation, from the deployment of II MEF and the Ford CSG to the shift from legal interdiction to kinetic elimination. It further allows the campaign to continue without congressional approval.

This significant disconnect between the stated threat and the nature of the U.S. response is the smoking gun. The extraordinary measures are poorly suited for counternarcotics but perfectly aligned with a long-standing, unstated political objective: regime change to a long-standing challenger to U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. As some institutions have noted, the current administration’s foreign policy focus on Latin America bears a resemblance to the age of the Monroe Doctrine and the Cold War’s spheres of influence, where regional hegemony was synonymous with national security. Operation Southern Spear is a clear embodiment of that very foreign policy.

The High Price of Securitization

The present administration, having made the securitization of Latin America a hallmark foreign policy approach, has embarked on a high-risk policy that is likely to fall short in its stated, unstated, and strategic objectives. The long-term risks of this strategy are profound, inviting historical failure, enabling geopolitical adversaries, and ultimately creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that undermines U.S. security.

The first risk flows directly from the creation of the zone of exception. When an issue is lifted beyond politics, long-term planning, diplomatic considerations, and uncomfortable questions about “what comes after” are dismissed as weak or obstructionist. The administration is myopically focused on toppling a regime while ignoring the clear, disastrous lessons of history. U.S.-led attempts at regime change fail far more often than they succeed. Even “successful” overthrows, such as in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, failed to lead to long-term stability and instead produced cycles of repression and violence. By focusing only on toppling the regime, the administration repeats the core error of Iraq and Libya. The securitization process directly causes this risk. Because the threat is existential, the only goal is its elimination, which precludes careful post-conflict planning. Decades of research confirm this: foreign-imposed regime change drastically increases the likelihood of civil war in the target state.

#### You should cut updates.

Dian Sary 26. Master’s Student in International Relations at Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. “Sovereignty in the Crosshairs: Great Power Securitization and the Global Order Crisis.” Modern Diplomacy. January 11, 2026. diplomacy.eu/2026/01/11/sovereignty-in-the-crosshairs-great-power-securitization-and-the-global-order-crisis/

These two issues are manifestations of the direction of the United States’ global policy, which increasingly shows the use of its political superiority to secure its national interests. In the theory of international relations, this phenomenon is a classic example of the securitization approach. A process in which issues are presented as an existential threat, thus overriding legal norms and procedures that affect the actions and policies of a country. (Buzan & Wæver, n.d.)

Economic sanctions, political isolation, and diplomatic pressure have long been applied by Washington through a securitization approach to Nicolas Maduro’s regime on the basis of human rights abuses. (Rodriguez, 2024) However, the United States’ latest approach shows a serious escalation by involving cross-border military operations and the detention of foreign heads of state.

In the modern international order, the head of state is the symbol of the highest sovereignty. Arresting the head of state means not only attacking the regime but also denying the legitimacy of the state as an equal subject of international law. (Benjamin & Hashimy, 2024)

The United States justifies the move as an effort to tackle the transnational crime of “narco-terrorism” and claims an intention to rein in Venezuela’s oil industry as part of global energy stabilization. According to many experts’ narratives, it fuels a debate about the motives of energy and power, not law and security. Many parties view this action as a form of direct intervention against the sovereignty of other countries. (Jeyaretnam and Guzman, 2026)

In Latin America, this move has sparked fears of a return to old patterns of intervention that have been historically traumatic. The issue of borders and asylum claims rejected by the United States due to the existence of a national policy of securitization and the anti-immigrant movement is still an unresolved issue. (Bull, 2020)

Furthermore, through the lens of securitization theory, Venezuela is positioned not as a legitimate political actor but as a threat to the security of the United States and the region. Venezuela has consistently been associated in the domestic framing and discourse of the United States with illegal migration flows, border crises, and socio-economic burdens. Maduro’s arrest reinforces the basis of the narrative that the source of domestic problems comes from outside, so the solution to the enforcement of U.S. sovereignty and national interests must be carried out beyond territorial boundaries.

However, the arrest of foreign heads of state through unilateral military operations is difficult to justify. The reason for law enforcement for transnational crimes does not automatically remove the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. From the point of view of international law, this event opens the discourse: Can a great power country use military force to enforce its agenda without international accountability? And to what extent can the principle of sovereignty be questioned for their “national interests and security”?

At the same time, three weeks after the operation in Venezuela, Trump voiced a desire to take over Greenland on security grounds. This discourse has sparked strong condemnation from NATO countries and is expected to undermine the foundations of the transatlantic alliance. The United States stated a diplomatic approach in its narrative because it was considered capable of maintaining Greenland’s security, while Denmark was claimed to have failed to overcome the influence of Russia and China.

The United States’ claim to Greenland is not a new phenomenon but rather part of a long history of geopolitical ambition. Washington’s interest in Greenland emerged as early as 1876, when the United States explored the possibility of buying Greenland from Denmark, but the attempt was rejected. During World War II, when Nazi Germany occupied Denmark in 1941, the United States used the situation to invade Greenland under the pretext of preventing Nazi expansion. Since then, Greenland has been a de facto part of the United States’ security zone, although it legally remains under Danish sovereignty. In 1941, the United States built a military and radio station. This treaty was later developed through the 1951 Defense Treaty between the United States and Denmark, which gave the United States the right to build, maintain, and operate military bases in Greenland to this day. (Szymański, 2021)

Geographically, Greenland is located on the shortest path between Russia and the United States through the North Pole. There is a strategic interest that the United States perceives as the first line of defense if there is a possibility of Russia launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, this security aspect is only one side of the United States’ interests. On the other hand, Greenland is believed to have strategic natural resources such as gold, tin, iron ore, copper, minerals, and potential oil reserves. Even if there is an ulterior motive of the United States for material interests framed under the pretext of national security, it is not a normative justification for coercive action against the sovereignty of another party. A similar pattern is also seen in the case of Venezuela.

Although it shows two different modes of securitization, the United States’ policy towards Venezuela and Greenland is based on the same strategic logic. In Venezuela, securitization is carried out through the personification of threats, where the state is reduced to a criminal regime figure that must be eradicated. This approach allows for the delegitimization of state sovereignty by targeting the head of state as a security threat. Meanwhile, in the case of Greenland, securitization is not directed at the regime but at the space in the form of territorial securitization. Through the narrative of threats from Russia and China, this region is constructed as a security risk that must be secured and controlled. (Jacobsen & Lindbjerg, 2024) Both of these issues lead to the same consequence, where sovereignty is treated as a negotiable subject when dealing with the narrative of national interests and security of great power countries like the United States.

Decisive action against Venezuela may be seen as an attempt to secure U.S. stability and interests in the region. However, a coercive approach risks increasing regional instability, deepening internal conflicts, and opening space for the intervention of other global powers. This criticism is not just unfounded rhetoric. The UN Security Council and several countries, including Denmark, affirm the inviolability of national borders and that such interventions violate the norms of peaceful conflict resolution and violate the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force between states as stipulated in the UN Charter. This principle is the basis of the international order to prevent unilateral actions that interfere with the territorial integrity of a country.

More broadly, the normalization of unilateral actions by great power countries, as in the case of Greenland, has the potential to undermine the rule-based international order. Within the framework of international relations, these dynamics show the tension between geopolitical realism and normative global orders. On the one hand, superpower countries make decisions based on perceptions of strategic interests such as national security and access to resources. On the other hand, when the policy is carried out through unilateral action, the fundamental principles of international law, including sovereignty, non-intervention, and self-determination, are reduced and cause a shift in global norms that should be universally applicable.

In the long run, this situation risks creating a world that is more fragmented, uncertain, and prone to conflict. It has the potential to normalize coercion as a foreign policy instrument. As well as making the global south the most vulnerable party, because it does not have the capacity to balance the pressure from the great powers. Venezuela and Greenland are a reminder that sovereignty is now under fire from a systemic pressure that is testing the future of the international security order.

#### It’s a topical burden.

Floyd Lambertson 9. Professor of Speech at the University of Northern Iowa. Quarterly Journal of Speech; Vol. 28, No. 4; "The meaning of the word ‘should’ in a question of policy," https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00335634209380806

"In a question of policy—or any other question—the word 'should' means 'that the policy advocated is necessary and desirable; that 'this house' commit itself to that policy, principle, or theory. But also, as a matter of common sense, it implies to some extent the 'could' and the 'would.' What is the sense of discussing at length the 'should' of a principle if it is not feasible, practicable, or attainable? In other words it is necessary for the affirmative to justify the policy or theory (the 'should') and also to some extent to set out— at least suggest—the technique of establishing it." Lew Sarett, Northwestern University.

#### Criticism of fearmongering forefronts genuine scrutiny that makes us as people more likely to solve extinction.

Derek Woods 21. Joshua Schuster; December 8, 2021; assistant professor of English at the University of British Columbia, associate professor of English and core faculty member of the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism at Western University; “Calamity Theory: Three Critiques of Existential Risk,” Calamity Theory: Three Critiques of Existential Risk, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/97552

This book, however, is unapologetically on the whole a work of negative critique. Much of the work of theory remains unmasking, demystification, and showing the unspoken historical and phil- osophical conditions of discourses such as existential risk—and this work is inclusive of more affirmative and creative conceptu- alizations. If existential risk were only an obscure philosophical subfield, it might not warrant this treatment. Why not reason with “no-nonsense” straight talk about the mitigation of possible human extinction, using whatever methods seem right to intellectuals who want to go there? Since existential risk has risen to a fairly high level of popularity and media impact, the field deserves close scrutiny from critics with a background in the study of related topics across the sciences and humanities. We have not been the only ones, and we hope others will continue this effort in the future. We also acknowledge that negative critique has obvious limitations in terms of providing immediate relief or resolution for existential risks. While that is not our primary purpose here, we note that critique, as well as fostering existential commons and reasoning through practices of care, relation building, economic equity, and environmental attentiveness, model ways to share a world—thus mitigating existential risk. A combination of patience, critique, sociability, imagination, and scientific reason may take us further in crafting just and habitable worlds than wide-eyed apocalyptic doomscrolling or the fantasy of living “long enough to live forever,” as Ray Kurzweil puts it.

#### Content matters: bracketing harmful rhetoric to prioritize consequences cements endo colonization.

Dr. Mark Lacy 15. Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University. “Security, Technology, and Global Politics” p. 8-10

For Virilio, attempts to contain the insecurity of geopolitics through improved global governance, 'free markets' and the liberal peace might transform security and war around the world, creating a world of perpetual peace and prosperity. The global economy - coupled with the acceleration of technology - might generate harmonious and creative societies where the unpleasant jobs have been replaced by machines and where there is a growing consensus that we need to accelerate and intensify distributive justice around the planet. Technology will not only improve our health and security - it will foster a cosmopolitan society built on the information technologies that expand the possibilities for dialogue. The war game will become the peace game that aids the improvement of the human condition.

Virilio isn't so sure about the optimistic liberal view of history. For Virilio, we are surrounded by the 'propaganda of an endless progress', the promise of a world where technology and capitalism will overcome the problems and suffering that have blighted the human condition; the 'propaganda of progress' is the vision of the future one often finds in corporate depictions of the future that illustrate how new products will transform life, creating an existence where a multitude of technologies are effortlessly integrated into everyday life to create more rewarding and efficient work and relationships.27 Virilio is less certain that technology and capitalism will improve the human condition, asking us to pay attention to what lies underneath this propaganda of progress in the world around us - in the stress, suffering, paranoia, control, exhaustion and inequality that he thinks might intensify in coming decades. Progress (and the peace game), on this view, is a progress in the arts and technologies of control designed to manage the growing numbers of the 'living dead' that are excluded from the 'legitimate' economy, to control those that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in 'network' society. As we see later, for Virilio the peace game is the war game turned inward, toward what he calls the endo-colonization of society, the attempt to control the constantly mutating terrains of security in the post-Cold War world.

The other side ofthe 'propaganda of an endless progress' is the 'administration of fear': Virilio suggests that we need to pay attention to the way fear (usually fear of otherness and difference) is used to distort debate over the problems we confront (so, for example, when fear of immigrants is presented as the cause of our economic woes and societal implosion - and the route to further disorder). For Virilio, we need to negotiate our way through both the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear, to pay attention to the way we can be captured by these 'easy' modes of responding to the world around us, to be constantly aware of these two very different traps. 9

Our world might be heading toward the realization of the liberal dream of progress but Virilio looks around and sees a world of accelerating ecological, economic and social degradation; politics becomes an increasingly narrow attempt to manage the insecurity and messiness in societies intent on realizing the dream of a fast and efficient consumer lifestyle. On this view, the politics of security that promises to control the messiness has a tendency to get out of control, nourishing the 'war-machine' and the 'military scientific complex', producing misguided security projects that generate chaos in the realization of policies that are often driven by fear, technological optimism about what technology and war can achieve, and a sense of cultural and racial superiority. 28

We might believe that we will learn from our mistakes (such as the wars that have dominated the first decade of the twenty-first century after 9111) but that is to become caught up with the 'propaganda of endless progress'. There is an excess to security that results in 'unnecessary wars' that become experimental zones for new technologies - and there is desire to control all aspects of life in increasingly intensive and extensive ways that risks to undermine civil liberties, tipping the balance of liberty and security toward the endo-colonization of society; an excessive focus on the problems of 'otherness' to the exclusion of the insecurity that comes from inside, from our financial systems or modes of consumption.

Military and political elites get caught up in the seductive possibilities offered by new technologies, the god-like ability to control the world. Virilio comments that: the nature of absolute speed is also to be absolute power, absolute and instantaneous control, in other words an almost divine power. Today, we have achieved the three attributes of the divine: ubiquity, instantaneity, immediacy; omnivoyance and omnipotence. 29

We can see an example of this excess of security and the desire to obtain these attributes of the divine in the discovery in June 2013 that the National Security Agency obtained direct access to the digital infrastructures of Google, Facebook, Apple and other companies, allowing the PRISM program to access the emails, file transfers, search histories and live chats of all citizens, the metadata of the world. While this desire to become an omnipotent machine of surveillance might confront ethical and limits - or might confront the limits of what is possible, the excess of information - the intention is clearly to know everything. 30 Or we can see this desire to control the world from a distance in the development of drone technology: machines of vision and death that make possible control-at-a distance.

In his preface to The Administration of Fear, Betrand Richard notes that 'this son of an Italian communist and a catholic from Brittany traces the rules of the game in which we are caught. And that we must escape' .31 We are trapped in a perverse situation where our societies are obsessed with security - but are governed with a security politics and economic policy that appears to be making the societies we live in more fragile (and thus requiring more 'security' and 'protection sciences'). The question that Virilio leaves us with is - after we negotiate through the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear - how do we escape the dangers of our accelerating reality, the darker possibilities made possible by the modem world? There is a sense in Virilio's work that past attempts to re-design how we live were not up to the task, producing new 'traps', new types of control. 10

So the optimistic 'liberal' student of international politics won't find much to agree with in Virilio's vision of politics and security. For the liberal optimist, the modem age has made it possible for our 'rationality' to overcome the irrational and dangerous aspects of the human condition; while there is much more to 'overcome' we are heading in the right direction and progress in this overcoming will be aided by new 'tools' and technologies; human existence is more civilized and secure than at any point in our history.32

The liberal will reply that information technologies are creating the foundation for a global public sphere that generates a 'transparent society' that makes it harder for states to hide what they do; Virilio replies that information technologies create new types of control and incarceration. Freedom and progress in this world order are illusions that mask the stress, control and inequality created by the system. The liberal will suggest that the continued growth in a interconnected global economy - where crisis is simply a glitch on the way to a world of progress for everybody around the planet - is a sign of the liberal capitalist world's resilience, its superiority to other ways of organizing human life.33 Virilio would reply that we should be careful not to mistake this resilience as proof of the universal or 'timeless' vitality or appeal of a capitalist (and not necessarily liberal) world order.

The liberal sees global mobility as a symbol of the emerging cosmopolitan world order that overcomes the limits of locality and nationalism. Virilio sees global mobility in terms of forced migration, of border camps, of climate refugees, of habitats that can no longer support human life. Writing about Michel Foucault's studies of prisons and asylums Virilio comments: 'I think that the real imprisonment is just ahead. '34 For Virilio, the problems on the horizon will expose the fragility of the ways of organizing life that were enjoyed in the West through the second half of the twentieth century: rapid technological, ecological and geopolitical transformation will force us to confront a reality where it becomes difficult to hold on to the values and ideas that shaped political imaginations in the West during much of the previous century.

#### The 1NC preempted ‘no shape reality’ and they dropped it! Conceded Morris here:

<<<FOR REFERENCE>>>

and justifications influence behavior at all levels (Anwar et al., 2020; Macías-Rojas, 2018; Salter & Mutlu, 2013). Wrange (2022, p. 577) describes security logics as a set of discursive interactions that shape identity, governance, and perceptions of threat, while Stępka (2022, p. 34) defines them as intersubjective meaning-making practices that activate a particular security mindset and influence how problems and their solutions are understood. In this context, technical communication becomes a medium through which threat perceptions and responses are made tangible via the rhetoric, imagery, and design choices that carry both symbolic and functional weight.

#### Discourse does shape reality, but their defense is irrelevant since reality shapes their discourse in a problematic manner.

Arviah Ayuingtyas 26. Faculty of Teacher Training and Education, Sebelas Maret University. Representation of Power and Hegemony of Seniority in Framing the News of the Suicide Case of Udayana University Students: An Analysis of Critical Discourse on the Media Kompas.com. and Tempo. Canadian Journal of Educational and Social Studies Vol. 6(1), 2026. https://www.cjess.ca/index.php/home/article/view/442

News about the case of Udayana University students in various mass media shows the dynamics of complex discourse. Each media outlet has its own way of framing events (Mardikantoro, 2022; Marzuki, 2023). Kompas.com tends to highlight moral and institutional aspects, focusing on the responses of universities and local governments. Meanwhile, Tempo.co is more critical in revealing the structural side, including practices of power, social inequality, and the weak student protection system on campus (Pešić, 2022; Dahlborg et al., 2024). This difference in news framing illustrates that media texts are never neutral, but rather the result of ideological practices that combine language, power, and social interests (Marzuki, 2023; Putri & Hamdani, 2024).

According to Fairclough (1995), every media discourse is a social practice that functions to form and maintain a certain social order; therefore, discourse analysis is not only a study of language but also a study of power. Fairclough developed a three-dimensional Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) model that includes the levels of text, discourse practice, and social practice (Fairclough, 1995). At the text level, analysis highlights linguistic aspects such as lexical choices, metaphors, and grammatical structures. The level of discourse practice focuses on the processes of production and consumption of texts, while the level of social practice examines the relationship between language and power in a broader social context (Fairclough, 1995; Marzuki, 2023). Within this framework, discourse analysis plays a role in exploring linguistic practices involved in the formation of dominant ideologies in society.

In its development, the study of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in Indonesia—especially in analyzing representations of power in the public sphere—has received serious attention from various scholars. Rahmah (2024) states that reporting on student bullying cases in Temanggung through Kompas.com represents subtle power that normalizes social dominance. Furthermore, Wardhana et al. (2025) show that online news about low literacy in Indonesia remains full of ideological bias. Ardhianti (2022) emphasizes that women’s language in reporting alleged sexual harassment at beauty pageants is still dominated by patriarchal views. Meanwhile, Anggini (2024), through an analysis of Regulation of the Minister of Education and Culture No. 30 of 2021, finds that campus policy discourse remains oriented toward institutional control rather than victim protection. Research by Dzarna and Oktarini (2023) demonstrates that language in Madurese short films is used to assert social hierarchy and cultural dominance.

In this context, research examining power and ideology in educational institutions remains limited, especially studies focusing on bullying or symbolic violence among students. This research fills that gap by examining news coverage of the death of Udayana University students using Fairclough’s CDA model to uncover representations of power and seniority-based hegemony in textual, discursive, and social constructions within media discourse, as well as to explore its relevance to the values of character education in academic environments (Syahwal, 2024; Rohmatulloh & Setiawati, 2025). Thus, this study represents a form of novelty, as no prior research has been found that analyzes the death of Udayana University students from a critical discourse analysis perspective while connecting it to character education values. This research is important for fostering critical awareness of the need to transform campus culture toward a more humane, egalitarian, and symbolically nonviolent academic environment (Zamroni, 2022; Rohmatulloh & Setiawati, 2025).

#### Burden for alt solvency: our speech act was the opposite of theirs. They preemptively create threats; we preemptively solve broader societal concerns.

Bahrooz Jafaar 26. Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies. “Middle East Geopolitical Dynamics and Their Impact on the Global Balance of Power.” Global Power Shift. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-032-06717-3\_4

Theories in international relations provide critical frameworks for understanding complex phenomena. Securitization theory, which emerged systematically in 1983 with the publication of Barry Buzan’s book “People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations,” plays a key role in this context. Later, this theory, championed by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, led to the establishment and development of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Securitization theory emphasizes the complexity of regional security by concentrating on how political actors frame specific issues as existential threats, thereby justifying extraordinary measures and emergency responses. It asserts that security is not an objective condition but a social construct, shaped by speech acts that classify certain issues as security concerns (Bilali et al., 2023).

As Eroukhmanoff (201) argues, securitization occurs when an issue is labeled a “threat” or “danger,” necessitating the allocation of social and political power to address it. In this perspective, security issues do not inherently arise from external factors but are internally constructed by security actors who elevate less critical issues into significant concerns that require immediate action. The theory highlights that issues themselves are not inherently dangerous but become security problems when framed as such. Historically, security was narrowly viewed as a matter of military confrontation, particularly during the Soviet-American Cold War. However, the concept has since expanded to encompass regional security, energy security, environmental security, social security, cyber security, and more.

As well as this development reflects a broader knowledge of security that goes beyond military capabilities and policing institutions. Securitization theory emphasizes that security is not a neutral act but a deeply political one, urging us to examine the various insecurities within international relations (Eroukhmanoff, 2018).

In essence, security is no longer limited to the military defense of the state; it encompasses a wide range of issues, a view that has been critiqued by proponents of realism. Realists argue that security should not be overly broadened, as this dilutes its focus. However, the relevance of securitization theory in international relations literature may have increased in light of conflicts like those in Ukraine and Gaza, which underscore the importance of addressing regional problems before they escalate into global crises. For instance, addressing issues such as corruption, institutional weaknesses, and governance failures in a country like Iraq could mitigate youth migration to Europe and the United States and prevent the spread of challenges like climate change, drug trafficking, and extremism.

#### Critique IS the alternative which means there is NO permutation---the problem solving paradigm assumes that a series of constraints are “true” e.g. opportunity costs, the exitance of the security state, a strict understanding of international relations, etc. Instead REJECT the rational-choice model that undergirds the failure of existing politics.

Tim Dunne 24. Professor of International Relations and Director of Research of the Asia-Pacifi c Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland. He is an editor of the European Journal of International Relations and has written and edited nine books, including Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (co-edited with Ken Booth, 2002) and Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Issues (co-edited with Steve Smith and Amelia Hadfi eld, 2008).. Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. International relations theories: Discipline and diversity. Oxford University Press, 2024 is the most recent version of the book.

This situation raises the question of the grounds on which we make a choice between theories. For many new undergraduate students of IR this is a major worry, since they want to be guided to the ‘right’ answer. And, of course, this is why realism has been so powerful, because it explicitly sees itself as the best account of the persistence of inter-state war and competition. We feel that there is much more at stake in answering this question. In my view, the fi rst criterion involved in making a choice between theories has to be the issues you wish to explain. Thus, if you are interested in the future of the environment, it is likely that green theory will be as good a place to start as any. That does not mean that only green theory can offer explanations, but it does give the reader a place to start their thinking about which is the most appropriate theory. It would be tempting to leave the issue of theory choice here, since I could imply that the theories in this book are all dealing with different, discrete, aspects of the same world of international relations, and that you could adopt a kind of ‘pick and mix’ attitude towards theory. Accordingly you might think it sensible to use, say, green theory when discussing the environment, feminism when discussing global gender inequalities, and structural realism when looking at great power rivalry in the Asia–Pacific. But though this might seem comforting, I do not think that this move is possible. This is because the various theories are not like parts of a jigsaw that can be neatly combined together with each explaining one part of international relations. Rather I think that the theories in this book are like different coloured lenses: if you put one of them in front of your eyes, you will see things differently. Some aspects of the world will look the same in some senses, for example shapes, but many other features, such as light and shade of colour, will look very different, so different in fact that they seem to show alternative worlds.

In thinking about this you might like to visualize Martin Hollis’s excellent example of a mobile hanging over a child’s bed, a metaphor he regularly used in his teaching. The view that the various theories each explain part of the world of international relations is akin to the view that someone standing looking at the child’s mobile will see the same mobile as the child lying on the bed, albeit from different angles. There is nothing incommensurable about their two perspectives; simple geometric analysis can show how their different views of the mobile can be combined together—they are just different views of the same mobile. Yet Hollis always argued, persuasively in my view, that the social world is not like this. The theories we use cannot simply be combined together so as to add up to different views of the same world of international relations; instead, they actually see different worlds. Thus a Marxist writer, though they will focus on power, will see a different form of power (ultimately economic) to that seen by a classical realist (ultimately political). Similarly, a classical liberal will not see cooperation over environmental issues in anything like the same way as a green theorist will see them. Finally, think of, say, a feminist writing about the global power structure, and compare it to a neorealist account. It is not possible simply to add up these various accounts of international relations to get one overarching theory. Theories are part of the social world, they can never be separate from it, and thus they constitute the social world in which we live. Each defi nes the problems to be examined differently, and may well defi ne how we know things about those problems in different ways. Thus the social location of the observer will infl uence which theory they see as most useful, simply because that location will predispose that observer to defi ne some features of international relations as key and others as less relevant.

#### Even best case,

Benjamin Zycher 24. Visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a senior fellow at the Pacific Research Institute, Ph.D. in Economics from UCLA. “Climate Policy Is a Federal Issue.” American Enterprise Institute. 3-19-2024. https://www.aei.org/op-eds/climate-policy-is-a-federal-issue/

The Honolulu lawsuit, like the others around the country, is meritless in its claims, first because U.S. emissions alone are virtually irrelevant as a component of global emissions. U.S. GHG emissions (in CO2 equivalents) from all fossil fuel consumption in 2021 were about 4.6 billion metric tons, rising slightly to about 4.7 bmt in 2022. Global emissions were about 41.3 bmt in 2022. If we estimate the climate effects of that U.S. GHG emissions share of 11.4%, using the Environmental Protection Agency climate model under assumptions that exaggerate those effects, U.S. GHG emissions would increase global temperatures in the year 2050 by 0.056°C. By 2100: 0.157°C. Even the predicted impact by 2100 would be barely detectable, because the normal year-to-year variation (“standard deviation”) in the surface temperature trend is about 0.11°C.

#### Jiang’s warrant for managing transition is thucydies trap.

Jiang ’25 [Shuguang, Marie Claire Villeval, Zhengping Zhang, and Jie Zheng; March 3; Doctorate, Professor at the Centre for Economic Research, Shandong University; PhD, Research Professor in Economics at the National Center for Scientific Research, University of Lyon; PhD, Associate Professor at Shandong Technology and Business University; PhD, Professor at the Centre for Economic Research, Shandong University; Hal Science, “War and Peace: How Economic Prospects Drive Conflictuality,” p. 1-4]

Although peace and development are central themes of our time, various forms of conflict – between nations, ethnic groups, organizations, and individuals– remain pervasive. High-profile geopolitical tensions, such as the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East, serve as stark reminders of the preciousness of peace. The shifting global landscape and power struggles among major nations are particularly concerning. Thucydides’s Trap, a concept popularized by political scientist Graham T. Allison (Allison, 2015, 2017), draws from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who noted that the rise of a new power often led to conflict with an established one. The idea has gained significant attention in contemporary international relations, particularly in the context of the perceived rivalry between the United States and China.

#### Racist.

Caldararo 17 (Thucydides “Trap, ” Ideology or Economic Bias? Niccolo Caldararo, Ph.D. Dept. of Anthropology San Francisco State University) arnav

Rachman begins with Graham Allison's "Thucydides Trap" theory. Above we have examined this theory and seen how it immediately falls into ruins under examination. To bring this into a contemporary context one can see the parallel, but it is the obverse of the Greek situation which we have sketched above. The US and the European powers have conquered and dominated the globe for four centuries. Their power was broken in two great civil or tribal wars in the 20th century where Europeans and the Americans wasted their treasure and people in years of massacre. Now in the shadow of that disaster the west faces those it oppressed. That is only natural, but it is not a consequence of what Dr. Allison's theory predicts. His is an entirely eurocentric view of the world.

#### It also turns case. The

#### Warming link.

#### That climate-security nexus entrenches a Neo-Malthusian interventions and imperial overstretch.

Kristen Billings 24. Master of Science Thesis, Community and Environmental Sociology; Research Assistant at University of Wisconsin-Madison Kristen R., 8-23-2024, “Resilient Empire: The Coloniality of U.S. Climate Securitization and Abolitionist Countertopographies Of Militarism,” p. 12-18, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/85692

From Environmental Warfare to Environmental Security

In the 1990s, western security analysts adopted neo-Malthusian warnings that ecological stress would damage U.S. national security interests, spurred by a confluence of factors, including the end of Cold War tensions and newly felt criticism of excessive U.S. military presence and spending, as well as growing environmental consciousness and efforts to address ecological exigencies in international forums (McDonald 2021). This signaled an important shift from mid-century military interests in the weaponization of environmental and climate change to late-century interests in their securitization, a discursive process by which security actors articulate the urgency of political issues and remove them from politics to a state of exception, where security actors are the responsible party for defining and responding to threats (Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). Ecological concerns spotlighted by the environmental movement became the purview of military and security planners, lifting them from the realm of civilian influence—as security studies scholar Simon Dalby argues, securitization of the environment “ultimately disenfranchises the majority, stripping environmental ‘speech’ from its more emancipatory projects” (Dalby 2002). The U.S. and its allies, seeking to manage a new unipolar world order and justify peacetime military spending, folded the environment into national security planning; the new focus on environmental security was fueled by the “global managerialist ambitions of some northern planners,” who sought to engage in neo-colonial governance of natural resources and environmental problems (Dalby 1999:26). During the postCold War moment, very legitimate public concerns about the environment, such as ozone depletion and air pollution, were transmogrified into a scarcity-conflict model that built “an image of an overpopulated, environmentally degraded and violent Third world” (Hartmann 1998:114). The void left by the Cold War was quickly filled by an environmental security 13 agenda that offered renewed purpose to the military industrial complex and “mask[ed] the tragic human consequences of US support for military regimes and Duvalier-style dictatorships” (Hartmann 1998:114).

#### The rhetorical innovation of national security extinguishes the subaltern, turning the case thru cyclical intervention.

Marcus Heiligenthal 26. Professor at Binghamton University. “Imperial Arbitrage: Global Precaritization, Human Rights, and the Financial Logic of Risk Management in the United States Drone Program.” *Human Rights in the Age of Drones*. January 2, 2026. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-032-08191-9\_4

Through the vehicle of the “War on Terror,” the United States has engaged in a global project of precaritization in the name of national security. Shifting the risks inherent to the US imperial project from the American center to the global periphery by privileging US rights to safety over global human rights, the “War on Terror” becomes the dehumanizing, justificatory discourse in which securitization—or the transferring and thus off-loading of risk—takes place. While the claim that the “War on Terror” is an effort to proactively secure American interests is well-tread intellectual territory, what remains underdetermined in this conversation is the relationship between the technology of the drone and, bearing in mind Randy Martin’s Empire of Indifference, the “financial logic of risk management” constitutive of American preemptive warfare (Martin, An Empire of Indifference: American War and the Financial Logic of Risk Management, Duke University Press, 2007). Reading the earlier formations of preemptive warfare through the lens of both economic theories of risk, this chapter makes three primary claims: (1) That through the logic of preemption, the United States intervenes into the uncertainty of the future, names these imagined dangers, and intervenes through assassination-by-drone. (2) The technology of the drone is the means par excellence facilitating a strategy I am naming “imperial arbitrage,” one that creates a “zero-risk” scenario for the imperial center where no American bodies can be harmed, US capital expenditures a relatively minimal; and political optics are largely controllable. (3) That the result of the logic of preemptive securitization through the means of the drone, or the “Hellfire Hedge,” is a presumed, normative expansion of strikes ad infinitum as blowback only stabilizes when exponential expansion of interventions is presumed.

#### Bankruptcy reform is animated by securitization, cementing a politics of austerity.

Janne Autto 22. University of Lapland. “Fear and insecurity in the politics of austerity.” European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23254823.2021.1888763#abstract

The politics of austerity, which spread to a number of Western countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, is often associated with fear. Fears regarding the functioning of the economy and, especially, excessive government debt are a major motivation and justification for austerity (Blyth, Citation2013). The post-crisis political scenarios often evoked a fear of national bankruptcy resulting from a major budget deficit. As economist Paul Krugman (Citation2015) states, ‘Every country running significant budget deficits – as nearly all were in the aftermath of the financial crisis – was deemed at imminent risk of becoming another Greece unless it immediately began cutting spending and raising taxes’. Yet, later the dreaded example of Greece was broadly seen more as a unique case (Krugman, Citation2015). The need to assuage the fears of external creditors, investors, corporations and even households is also used as a justification for austerity (Blyth, Citation2013; Bryan & Rafferty, Citation2017, p. 342; Cairns, de Almeida Alves, Alexandre, & Correia, Citation2016; Schäfer & Streeck, Citation2013, p. 20). Moreover, according to Mabel Berezin (Citation2013, p. 258), the sovereign debt crisis had a significant impact on the political atmosphere in Europe: it speeded up the normalisation of the right and shook optimistic views of a united Europe which, according to Berezin, created a threat that fear and pessimism would become dominant political emotions.

Besides economic fears, the politics of austerity is argued to be based on moral fears. According to John Clarke and Janet Newman, the politics of austerity takes in a fear of moral disorder or ‘demoralisation’, which is ‘seen as the result of dependency-inducing statism and welfarism’ (Citation2012, pp. 310–311). Moreover, political unrest and protest are seen as manifestations of moral disorder. On the other hand, as ‘(e)xpenditure cuts carry a significant risk of increasing the frequency of riots, anti-government demonstrations, general strikes, political assassinations, and attempts at revolutionary overthrow of the established order’, these are mentioned as fear-related reasons why governments want to avoid austerity measures (Ponticelli & Voth, Citation2011, pp. 24–25; see also Clarke & Newman, Citation2012, pp. 308–309).

Even though fear obviously seems to play an essential part in the politics of austerity, there is a lack of research on the relation between austerity and fear, not to mention the relation between austerity and the politics of fear. The politics of fear is rarely mentioned in the context of austerity; it is only regarded as a result of austerity and as taking a form of hostility towards ‘the others’, such as towards the unemployed and immigrants, or towards dissident voices, and blaming them for economic problems (Arampatzi, Citation2017; Bramall, Citation2013, p. 21). This kind of politics of fear is also contested ‘from below’ (Arampatzi, Citation2017). Salomi Boukala's and Dimitra Dimitrakopoulou’s study (Citation2017) makes an exception, as it analyses how the two main parties in Greece–the radical left Syriza and the conservative New Democracy–legitimated their political lines through a politics of fear and a politics of hope in the 2015 election and referendum campaigns. Their analysis shows that New Democracy constructed a fear that Syriza would drive the nation back to the hardships of austerity, which Syriza counterargued by linking fears towards austerity with threats to European heritage. The authors also show how political dichotomies are rhetorically constructed through fear and hope, but they do not focus on how the politics of fear works in political debates over austerity.

### AT: Acid

#### Their authors are generally ridiculous. Turchin is an EA freak that they highlighted like a christmas tree.

#### Cribb’s only degree is in Homeric Greek, not a scientist---reject it. Also doesn’t have a PhD… Just a Bachelors

Cribb 21 (Julian Cribb, Homeric Greek Expert, Science Communicator; “ASC Scope Interview: Julian Cribb, Science Communicator, Journalist, Author and Strong Advocate for Earth’s Future,” Australian Science Communicators, 01-11-21, https://www.asc.asn.au/blog/2021/01/11/asc-scope-interview-julian-cribb-science-communicator-journalist-author-and-strong-advocate-for-earths-future/)

Why did you choose to study science?

A: My degree is in Homeric Greek, so I didn’t study science – but having a bit of Greek and Latin is a big help in translating scientific words, and the philosophy of science owes its origins to the Greeks. However, I was always fascinated by science and, in my first career as an agricultural journalist, I found myself reporting a lot of science – animal science, soil science, ecology, agronomy, weather, climate etc. I wrote my first climate change story back in 1976! In the 1990s The Australian asked me to come and work for them (again, I had worked there before) and asked me what I wanted to report on. I said science, because the opportunities for a news journalist in science are limitless (as distinct from politics, economics etc which repeat themselves constantly). I was their science editor for 5 years and thoroughly enjoyed it. While on the Oz, I was the first western journalist into Chernobyl after the disaster – but that is a story in itself. I’m glad I don’t work there today, as the Oz has abandoned any attempt to report science objectively and often seeks to distort it nowadays. But in my days the editors were better and the political agenda was less stark.

#### Regulation solves.

Katz et al 22 - Harrison Katz is a Reporter for Possibly, Ashley Junger is a Managing Producer for Possibly, Megan Hall is the Host/Managing Producer for Possibly, “What happened to acid rain?” January 31, https://thepublicsradio.org/episode/what-happened-to-acid-rain/ Accessed: 9/30/24)

Megan Hall: So, why don’t we talk about acid rain anymore?

Ashley Junger: Meredith Hastings says it’s mostly because it’s not a problem anymore, thanks to the Clean Air Act.

Meredith Hastings: In the United States, Acid Rain became a big problem in the 1980s. As a result, they passed the Clean Air Act. Acid Rain has dramatically decreased, particularly in the northeast United States, because of the Clean Air Act reducing emissions from coal combustion and vehicles.

Megan Hall: So, acid rain doesn’t exist anymore?

Harrison Katz: Well, The Clean Air Act led to the creation of over a hundred rain monitoring stations around the US.

Ashley Junger: And according to data from those stations, acid rain does still happen, just not nearly as much.

Meredith Hastings: The maps are really dramatic if you look at how much the rain has gotten more basic, and less acidic. It’s largely a success story. Has the problem completely gone away? No. But it’s really dramatically decreased.

### AT: Warming

#### Negative feedback loops check.

EH 25. Individual authors for Earth How, a team of Earth Scientists who are passionate about all aspects of learning. The focus is on being clear, concise, and comprehensive with a range of infographics, guides, and lists. Consistently Referenced and Cited in Academic Papers. “Climate Feedback Loops.” Earth How. January 13, 2025. https://earthhow.com/climate-feedback-loops/

We’re changing Earth’s climate. What happens next?

Negative climate feedback loops have beneficial results.

Instead of continued warming, they spark a favorable chain of events that lessen the severity of climate change.

Here are examples of negative feedback mechanisms for climate change:

1. Increased cloudiness reflects more incoming solar radiation

Rainfall Clouds Thunder Lightning

As ice sheets melt, this could increase cloudiness with more water vapor in the atmosphere.

Because clouds reflect 1/3 of incoming solar radiation, there would be less heat absorption on Earth’s surface.

2. Higher rainfall from more moisture in the atmosphere

ocean currents

Similarly, if there’s more water held in the atmosphere, then higher water volume leads to more precipitation. This is because the atmosphere can retain more moisture with higher temperatures.

But the downside is that ocean circulation patterns would change and create an imbalance in where rainfall occurs.

3. Net primary productivity increase

Soil Nutrients

As higher concentrations of CO2 enter the atmosphere, plants have more material to photosynthesize. If you isolate a single plant in a laboratory, then adding CO2 makes Earth greener for now. But this fertilization effect diminishes with time.

But plants can’t grow indefinitely with rising CO2. This is because plants require other factors like nitrogen in the nutrient cycle. And if temperature rises, this can negatively influence plant growth.

4. Blackbody radiation

The energy released by Earth is a function of temperature. If Earth’s temperature increases, it raises the amount of outgoing radiation.

So the more energy you add to Earth, the more energy it will emit. This concept is the Stefan-Boltzmann law which has an overall cooling effect.

5. Chemical weathering as a carbon dioxide sink

Chemical Weathering

With more CO2 and water in the atmosphere, it increases carbonic acid which is just CO2 and water. Chemical weathering in rocks is a sink for atmospheric carbon dioxide. Thus, it weakens the greenhouse effect and leads to cooling.

This natural process of chemical weathering not only helps regulate Earth’s climate over geological timescales but also underscores the intricate feedback mechanisms that influence the composition of our planet’s atmosphere.

6. The ocean’s solubility pump

The solubility pump refers to the ocean’s ability to transport carbon from its surface to the interior. The ocean serves an important role in regulating CO2 by dissolving it in water.

As ice sheets melt, carbon storage increases. Currently, oceans absorb 33% of CO2 emitted to the atmosphere. Although this process cannot continue indefinitely, solubility pump efficiency depends on ocean circulation.

7. Lapse rate and altitude temperature

Lapse rate refers to the change of temperature with altitude. Air expands higher in the troposphere because there is less pressure. Conversely, the air compresses lower in the troposphere because there is more pressure.

Climate models indicate that global warming will reduce the decreasing rate of temperature with height. Overall, this weakens the strength of the greenhouse effect.

#### Risks are unrealistic AND negative feedback erases any downsides.

Dr. Matthew G. Burgess 24. PhD, Assistant Professor, Environmental Studies, University of Colorado Boulder. Affiliate Faculty, Economics, University of Colorado Boulder. Fellow, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder. Director, Center for Social & Environmental Futures, University of Colorado Boulder, "Five Considerations for Twenty-First Century Climate Policy," Florida International University Law Review, Vol. 18, No 2, Spring 2024, pg. 285-289.

The most widely-used scenarios in climate impacts research are the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) and the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) marker scenarios.4 These scenarios were central to the IPCC’s Fifth and Sixth Assessment Reports, respectively.5 There are four RCP scenarios, which span a range of roughly 2ºC warming (above pre-industrial temperatures) by 2100 (RCP2.6) to roughly 4.5ºC warming by 2100 (RCP8.5). There are seven SSP marker scenarios, spanning a range of roughly 1.5ºC warming by 2100 (SSP1-1.9) to roughly 4.5ºC warming by 2100 (SSP5-8.5). The number at the end of each scenario name represents the forcing in 2100 (e.g., RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5 each produce roughly 8.5W/m^2 forcing in 2100). The SSPX number (X) in SSP scenarios denotes one of five socioeconomic sets of assumptions (“storylines”: SSP1, SSP2, . . . , SSP5),6 which vary in their assumed economic growth, population growth, trade and technological advancement, and other factors. The sets of RCP and SSP marker scenarios are chosen from a broader family of thousands of scenarios produced by the integrated assessment modeling community.7 The sets of marker scenarios were not designed to be accurate predictions of the future, but rather to span a range of possible outcomes. This range includes both scenarios consistent with the target of limiting warming to 1.5ºC (SSP1-1.9) and scenarios at the extreme high-emissions end (RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5), representing coal-dominated futures with no climate policy in place throughout the century.8

Climate impact research has overwhelmingly focused on RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5,9 and studies often incorrectly label these scenarios as “business as usual.”10 These scenarios account for more than half of scenario mentions in the most recent IPCC WGII report and U.S. National Climate Assessment.11 Studies using these high-emission scenarios are often cited in popular media, as they tend to produce the most dramatic headlines.12 Overuse of these scenarios and mislabeling them as business as usual has been widely criticized since 2020.13 RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5 remain the most commonly used scenarios, but a recent review of one sub-discipline (fisheries and aquatic conservation) found that, since 2020, these scenarios have been less-often called business as usual, and have been more-often paired with another lower-emission scenario within studies.

The reason impact studies’ widespread reliance on RCP8.5 and SSP5- 8.5 has become controversial is that multiple lines of evidence suggest that these scenarios are implausible.14 They project global coal demand per person as increasing by three times to six times,15 while the International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that coal demand per person will decrease under current policies or stated policies.16 SSP5-8.5 projects a world in 2100 that has gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of over 100,000 USD in today’s dollars in every major world region and no climate policy at all (including policies that exist today),17 despite the fact that 4.5ºC warming would make many tropical regions have unlivable wet-bulb temperatures for over 300 days per year.18

Recent studies, from a variety of research groups and a variety of methods, now suggest that the world is on a path that would cause between 2ºC and 3ºC of warming, assuming mid-range climate sensitivity to emissions (more on this below). Constant emissions from 2019 to 2100 would produce approximately 3ºC of warming by 2100,19 current policies would produce 2.6–2.9ºC of warming by 210020 (similar to RCP4.5 or SSP2- 4.5), pathways consistent with stated policies would produce approximately 2.2ºC of warming by 210021 (similar to SSP2-3.4), and countries meeting their pledges and targets produce pathways consistent with limiting warming by 2100 to 2ºC or slightly less22 (similar to RCP2.6 or SSP1-2.6). Modeling studies simulating continued changes in the sociopolitical system that are consistent with recent history project between 2ºC and 2.5ºC of warming by 2100.23 Figure 1 below summarizes some of these pathways, compared to the SSP marker scenarios.

The physical climate system adds additional layers of uncertainty. There are uncertainties regarding: how sensitive the climate is to forcing;24 the degree to which declines in anthropogenic aerosol pollution (which has a cooling effect) could accelerate warming;25 and whether, when, and how fast tipping points (e.g., melting permafrost releasing methane, sea ice melt reducing albedo)26 might occur that accelerate warming beyond what models currently project. These uncertainties bring 2100 warming levels as low as 1.5ºC and as high as 4ºC into the realm of possibility.27

[Figure omitted]

The human side also carries deep uncertainties and potential for surprises. For example, climate feedbacks producing higher-than-expected warming could be negated by human-side feedbacks of high warming causing lower emissions via economic damage.34 Feedbacks between emissions reductions and the political feasibility of climate policies,35 or positive feedbacks in the technology and economics of carbon-free energy36 could result in faster-than-expected emissions reductions. Major geopolitical events can cause disruptions favoring higher or lower emissions (or both at the same time in different regions or sectors), as the war in Ukraine illustrates.37

The plausibility of mid-range warming scenarios (and the implausibility of extreme ones) has several important policy implications. First, consumers and users of climate impact studies (i.e., policy makers, politicians, planners, private industry, etc.) should pay close attention to which scenarios are used, since extreme scenarios still predominate the scientific literature.38 Users of climate impact research should emphasize results from mid-range scenarios (i.e., RCP4.5, SSP2-4.5, SSP2-3.4) in their assessments of most likely future outcomes. Second and relatedly, policymakers and politicians should be aware of the existence and abundance of climate misinformation in the public sphere based on misuse of extreme scenarios (especially RCP8.5 and SSP5- 8.5) or miscommunication about exploratory studies using these scenarios.39 This is a type of misinformation that may be less salient than the well-studied types of misinformation that deny the physical science of climate change.40 Since misuse of extreme scenarios originates inside the scientific community (unlike denialism, which mostly comes from outside), it risks exacerbating recent declines in trust in the scientific community.41

#### Specifically, phytoplanktonic assimilation. It’s scientifically confirmed.

Laurient Oziel et al. 25. Alfred-Wegener-Institute - Helmholtz-Zentrum für Polar- und Meeresforschung, Bremerhaven, Germany. “Climate change and terrigenous inputs decrease the efficiency of the future Arctic Ocean’s biological carbon pump.” *Nature*. January 6, 2025. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-024-02233-6

In our Terr simulation, we mostly attribute the 75% NPP increase by the end of the century (Figs. 2a and 3a) to warming, subsequent sea ice decline and increase in light availability. Such NPP stimulation increases net nitrogen assimilation by phytoplankton by 42% (Figs. 2b and 3b), which will progressively shift the AO from a light-limited system to a nutrient-limited system (from ~20% of the AO area limited by nutrients in the 1970s to ~60–80% in the 2090s; Fig. 3c). This climate-driven shift towards a more nutrient-limited AO, in line with previous expectations6,15, is reflected in the phytoplankton community and elemental stoichiometry. Our results confirm a compositional shift towards a dominance of small phytoplankton over diatoms38,39 (Supplementary Fig. 2), with increasing phytoplankton C:N ratios (Supplementary Fig. 3). Eventually, phytoplankton elemental stoichiometry is transferred to detritus properties (Extended Data Fig. 2c). One could therefore expect a classic negative feedback loop on atmospheric CO2 (Fig. 4a and Methods), where less sea ice drives more light availability, more NPP and more carbon export flux, and ultimately favours the uptake of atmospheric CO2 by the AO.